Category: Case Law Updates
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Can a child’s attorney be forced to disclose privileged information?
That’s the question pending in the Third DCA. According to buzz around the courthouse (which I’ve had to sit in for a while these past 48 hours), a certain youth in a certain courtroom had gone “on run”, a term I despise for what it implies and what it omits. The only person who the…
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Fixing shelter representation
One of my three readers wrote separately to note that the 72-hour hearing is not the only possible solution to the shelter representation requirement. The reader reports that Broward defense attorneys take turns doing shelter duty. All shelters are handled by one judge for the week, and attorneys rotate being present for them. That’s an…
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Good Cause has a Shelf Life When Ordering Psych Evals
From J.B. v. M.M., — So.3d —-, 2012 WL 2913287 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012): While we acknowledge that “past conduct” may be taken into consideration when determining whether a parent has been able to meet the needs of the child, the information relied upon regarding the mother’s alleged inability to parent her daughter is over eight years old.…
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Parents still get counsel at shelter hearings
The case is G.W. v. Department of Children & Families, — So.3d —-, 2012 WL 2947772 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2012). The father appears at his shelter hearing; he’s appointed counsel, an attorney who is understandably not present at the time; and his child is sheltered then and there. He’s sent off. This happens every day at just…
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Fourth DCA: Consent to 39.806(1)(c) is Consent to LRM
Though this isn’t as exciting as the Affordable Healthcare Act ruling, it’s at least a substantive dependency case, which we haven’t seen in what feels like forever. It’s been a very quiet summer. Thank goodness for the Fourth DCA who this week adopted the Second DCA’s reasoning from In re G.M., holding that an implied consent…
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Juvenile LWOP Unconstitutional
Is the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a fourteen-year-old child convicted of homicide a violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when the child did not personally engage in any physical violence toward the victim and when the sentence resulted from a mandatory sentencing scheme? In…
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Case Law Review: Defaults, One-Parent Findings, Swahili Consents to Adoption, Paternity Standing, and TPRs for Chronic Mental Illness
(1) You can only default at an advisory or trial, not a pretrial or calendar call. J.E. v. DCF, — So.3d —-, 2012 WL 1889781 (Fla. 2nd DCA) (haven’t we learned this by now?). (2) In M.W. v. DCF, — So.3d —-, 2012 WL 1889783 (Fla. 2nd DCA) (so close), the mother and father were TPR’d. The…
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ACLU and NASW File Amicus Briefs on Dual Maternity Case
The ACLU and National Association of Social Workers have filed amicus briefs in the Dual Maternity case. I haven’t read them yet, but they’re available here.
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Judge Griffin in the Fifth: 39.806(1)(j) Makes No Sense
Judge Griffin dissented in part from a TPR appeal to point out the lunacy of section 39.806(1)(j): I am unable to concur in the decision to remand for removal of the termination under Section 39.806(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2011). That section was added to the list of grounds for termination of parental rights in 2008, and,…